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Couto JB, Manes F, Montañes P, Matallana D, Reyes P, Velásquez MM, Yoris A, Báez S, Ibanez A.  Structural neuroimaging of social cognition in progressive non-fluent aphasia and behavioral variant of frontotemporal dementia. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience

Social cognition impairments are pervasive in the frontotemporal dementias (FTD). These deficits would be triggered by (a) basic emotion and face recognition processes as well as by (b) higher level social cognition (e.g., theory of mind, ToM). Both emotional processing and social cognition impairments have been previously reported in the behavioral variant of FTD (bvFTD) and also in other versions of FTDs, including primary progressive aphasia. However, no neuroanatomic comparison between different FTD variants has been performed. We report selective behavioral impairments of face recognition, emotion recognition, and ToM in patients with bvFTD and progressive non-fluent aphasia (PNFA) when compared to controls. Voxel-based morphometry (VBM) shows a classical impairment of mainly orbitofrontal (OFC), anterior cingulate (ACC), insula and lateral temporal cortices in patients. Comparative analysis of regional gray matter related to social cognition deficits (VBM) reveals a differential pattern of fronto-insulo-temporal atrophy in bvFTD and an insulo-temporal involvement in PNFA group. Results suggest that in spite of similar social cognition impairments reported in bvFTD and PNFA, the former represents an inherent ToM affectation whereas in the PNFA these deficits could be related to more basic processes of face and emotion recognition. These results are interpreted in the frame of the fronto-insulo-temporal social context network model (SCNM).

Yoris A, Esteves S, Couto B, Melloni M, Kichic R, Cetkovich M, Favaloro R, Moser J, Manes F, Ibanez A, Sedeño L. The roles of interoceptive sensitivity and metacognitive interoception in panic. Behav Brain Funct. 2015 10.3389/fnagi.2014.00122

The roles of interoceptive sensitivity and metacognitive interoception in panic. Autores Yoris A, Esteves S, Couto B, Melloni M, Kichic R, Cetkovich M, Favaloro R, Moser J, Manes F, Ibanez A, Sedeño L. Año 2015 Journal  Yoris A, Esteves S, Couto B, Melloni M, Kichic R, Cetkovich M, Favaloro R, Moser J, Manes F, Ibanez A, Sedeño […]

Báez S, Herrera E, Gershanik O, García A, Bocanegra Y, Kargieman L, Manes F, Ibanez A. Impairments in negative emotion recognition and empathy for pain in Huntington's disease families. Neuropsychologia 2015

Impairments in negative emotion recognition and empathy for pain in Huntington’s disease families. Autores Báez S, Herrera E, Gershanik O, García A, Bocanegra Y, Kargieman L, Manes F, Ibanez A. Año 2015 Journal  Báez S, Herrera E, Gershanik O, García A, Bocanegra Y, Kargieman L, Manes F, Ibanez A. Volumen Abstract   Otra información    

Couto B, Adolfi F, Sedeño L, Salles A, Canales-Johnson A, Alvarez-Abut P, Garcia-Cordero I, Pietto M, Bekinschtein T, Sigman M, Manes F, Ibanez A. Disentangling interoception: insights from focal strokes affecting the perception of external and internal milieus. Front Psychol. 2015

Disentangling interoception: insights from focal strokes affecting the perception of external and internal milieus. Autores Couto B, Adolfi F, Sedeño L, Salles A, Canales-Johnson A, Alvarez-Abut P, Garcia-Cordero I, Pietto M, Bekinschtein T, Sigman M, Manes F, Ibanez A. Año 2015 Journal  Couto B, Adolfi F, Sedeño L, Salles A, Canales-Johnson A, Alvarez-Abut P, Garcia-Cordero I, […]

Martino D, Samamé C, Ibanez A, Strejilevich S Neurocognitive functioning in the premorbid stage and in the first episode of bipolar disorder: a systematic review. . Psychiatry Research 2015 10.1002/hbm.22200

In cognitive neuroscience, the reissue of the notion of emergence and downward causation has been used as an interlevel model of mind-brain interactions from different perspectives. Within this perspective, intentionality has been interpreted as global to local determination (downward causation) on the neurophysiological level. Consciousness would act as the large-scale, global activity of the system that governs or constrains local interactions of neurons. This argument seems to solve several difficulties with regard to descriptions of consciousness on a neurophysiological and mental level. Nevertheless, the inconsistencies of this argument are shown, and a contextual and pragmatic explanation of the downward causation of consciousness is given.