Neurocognitive functioning in the premorbid stage and in the first episode of bipolar disorder: a systematic review.
|Autores||Martino D, Samamé C, Ibanez A, Strejilevich S|
|Journal||Martino D, Samamé C, Ibanez A, Strejilevich S|
|Abstract||In cognitive neuroscience, the reissue of the notion of emergence and downward causation has been used as an interlevel model of mind-brain interactions from different perspectives. Within this perspective, intentionality has been interpreted as global to local determination (downward causation) on the neurophysiological level. Consciousness would act as the large-scale, global activity of the system that governs or constrains local interactions of neurons. This argument seems to solve several difficulties with regard to descriptions of consciousness on a neurophysiological and mental level. Nevertheless, the inconsistencies of this argument are shown, and a contextual and pragmatic explanation of the downward causation of consciousness is given.|